Iran threatens to use submarine cables as a new weapon
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard has escalated its rhetoric in the Gulf region, threatening to use a new pressure tactic: subjecting submarine fiber optic internet cables passing through the Strait of Hormuz to a “permit system.” This unprecedented move reflects Tehran’s relentless efforts to expand its control and influence over one of the world’s most vital energy, trade, and communications arteries. While it remains unclear who would be subject to these fees or permits—whether the cable-laying companies, their owners, or their operators—Tehran bases its threat on its claim of absolute sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil within its territorial waters.
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz: from oil to data
Historically, the Strait of Hormuz has been known as the world's most important maritime chokepoint for oil, with roughly one-fifth of the world's crude oil consumption passing through it. Iran has long used the threat of closing the strait as a political and military bargaining chip during international crises. With rapid technological advancements, the strait has become a vital corridor not only for energy but also for the flow of global data. Today, submarine cables carry more than 95% of international communications and data traffic, making any threat to them a direct threat to the national and economic security of the countries connected to them.
The most threatened submarine cables in the strait
The communications network passing through the strait includes critical infrastructure, most notably a branch of the AAE-1 (Asia-Africa-Europe) cable. This system is one of the longest submarine cables, connecting Asia to Europe via the Middle East and Egypt, and extending from Hong Kong to France. In addition, two other cables, Falcon and Gulf Bridge, also pass through the strait, linking the Gulf states, including Iran, to India and East Africa, reaching as far as Egypt. These cables carry massive data flows, including sensitive financial transactions, government communications, emails, and videos, according to Alan Mouldin, research director at Telegeography, a company specializing in global communications data.
Potential economic and security repercussions
Regionally, the Gulf Arab states rely heavily on the stability of these cables to support their ambitious digital transformation plans and the development of knowledge-based economies. Any disruption or Iranian blackmail could affect the speed and reliability of the internet, negatively impacting business and financial sectors. Internationally, targeting internet infrastructure represents a dangerous escalation that could necessitate international intervention to protect freedom of navigation and the flow of information, just as traditional maritime shipping lanes are protected.
Available alternatives and their effectiveness
Despite the seriousness of the threats, experts believe the likelihood of a global outage or disruption remains limited. Alan Muldane explains that data flowing between Europe and Asia is not exclusively dependent on the AAE-1 cable branch running through the Gulf. Furthermore, Gulf states have multiple alternative communication networks. However, Muldane cautions that any disruption to this particular branch could directly impact communications in Qatar, given its route through the Strait of Hormuz to Doha. While Gulf states do not rely entirely on these submarine cables to meet all their needs, the capacity of alternative terrestrial networks may not be sufficient to accommodate and reroute all data traffic should the submarine systems be significantly damaged, keeping the region on high alert.
